### 1

#### CIR will pass now but it will be tough

Nowicki, 10-30 -- Arizona Republic's national political reporter

[Dan, and Erin Kelly, "Fleeting Hopes for Immigration Reform," AZ Central, 10-30-13, www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20131029fleeting-hopes-immigration-reform.html?nclick\_check=1, accessed 10-31-13, mss]

However, reform backers point to encouraging signs in addition to the intense push by the business lobby. Key House Republicans, including Reps. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, Mario Diaz-Balart of Florida and Darrell Issa of California, reportedly are working on proposals to address the status of the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants who already have settled in the United States, which is the central issue for Democrats and immigration activists. The Democrat-controlled Senate on June 27 passed a sweeping reform bill that included a 13-year pathway to citizenship for immigrants who pass background checks, pay assessed taxes and fines and take other steps to get right with the law, as well as a massive investment in border security. There are indications that some Republicans are becoming impatient with the House inaction on piecemeal bills that have been talked about since the Senate bill passed. Two House Republicans — Reps. Jeff Denham of California and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida — have become the first two GOP lawmakers to sign onto a comprehensive immigration bill offered by House Democrats. Rep. Joe Heck, R-Nev., last week said in a written statement that the growing possibility that the House might punt on immigration reform in 2013 reflects “the leadership vacuum in Washington that rightly has so many people frustrated with this dysfunctional Congress.” Sen. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., a former 12-year House member who helped negotiate the Senate bill, said Monday on Twitter that momentum appears to be building in the House. “That’s good news for Arizona, and the country,” he said in the message. For their part, Boehner and his fellow House Republican leaders have not yet publicly declared immigration reform dead, which even the most pessimistic reform supporters say means there is still a chance the House could act in November or early December. House committees so far have approved five bills, including legislation to strengthen border security and require employers to use a federal database to ensure they are hiring people who are legally eligible to work in the United States. “The speaker said last week, ‘I still think immigration reform is an important subject that needs to be addressed. And I’m hopeful,’ ” Boehner spokesman Michael Steel told The Arizona Republic on Tuesday via e-mail. “He added that he supports a step-by-step immigration process.” Businesses speak out Hoping to make sure immigration reform gets on the House’s 2013 agenda, more than 600 business, law-enforcement, religious and political leaders from Arizona and nearly 40 other states flooded Capitol Hill on Tuesday. The fly-in was organized by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other groups, including FWD.us, which was founded by leaders of high-tech companies. The activists, mostly self-described conservatives, met with more than 100 members of Congress to urge them to take action on broad legislation that includes a way for most undocumented immigrants in the U.S. to earn citizenship. “In every corner of the Capitol, the energy these farmers, tech leaders, police chiefs and pastors brought to the Hill was palpable,” said Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum. “They brought a new perspective to the debate, one informed by what they see every day in their local businesses, churches and police stations — a broken system that has a negative impact on local communities nationwide.” Peoria Vice Mayor Tony Rivero is a conservative Republican who urged Arizona’s GOP congressmen to support reform this year. His city needs more farmworkers who are legally authorized to work, and it needs its undocumented residents to come out of the shadows, he said. “My message to our congressional delegation is that, as a constituent and a conservative Republican, I support a solution to this problem,” Rivero said. “We need to secure the border, identify the people who are here illegally and put them on a path to legality and put enforcement measures in place to make sure we aren’t here again in 10 years.” Former Phoenix Police Chief Jack Harris said he told members of Arizona’s congressional delegation that the current immigration system makes police officers’ jobs more complicated. “Every community is trying to solve the problem in a different way,” he said. “In some places, you (an undocumented immigrant) can get a driver’s license. In some places, you can’t. Some places are very liberal and report almost no crimes (committed by undocumented immigrants). Others deport you for just minor infractions. There’s great confusion among the law-enforcement community about what the rules are and what their authority is.” ‘I do care about them’ The conservative lobbying efforts are in conjunction with efforts from more liberal immigration-advocacy groups. Last week, a contingent of 44 undocumented immigrants and their supporters traveled from Phoenix by bus to Washington, D.C., and Ohio in hope of meeting with Boehner to persuade him to schedule a vote on a bill that includes a pathway to citizenship. The group, which included many “dreamers,” or undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as children, never got the opportunity to talk with Boehner. However, the immigration activists from the advocacy group Promise Arizona who camped outside Franks’ house did get the chance to talk with the representative for more than 25 minutes. They initially were buoyed by his response, which they interpreted as support for a pathway to citizenship. However, Franks later clarified to The Republic that he would not support a special pathway to citizenship. Franks said he would support legalizing undocumented immigrants under certain conditions but would not allow them to subsequently seek citizenship. Or the undocumented immigrants could return to their home countries and apply for green cards and citizenship that way, he said. Franks said he didn’t fully articulate his position to the activists because he felt compassion for their pleas. “Sometimes, in any situation, you don’t hit people in the face with the worst of it,” Franks said. “I wanted them to know, while maybe we didn’t agree on everything, there were some things we do agree on. I do care about them.” Proponents are positive Glenn Hamer, president and CEO of the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said the group of Arizonans that flew in as part of the U.S. Chamber-led D.C. visit were going to meet with all nine House members from Arizona. After morning meetings with Republican Reps. Paul Gosar, Matt Salmon and David Schweikert, Hamer said the sessions were positive. “There is complete agreement that we have a busted immigration system,” he said. “It’s fair to say that there is an understanding that we need immigration reform. It’s very clear that the House is going to pass its vision for immigration reform. If it’s simply the Senate bill or bust, then nothing will happen.” Flake said he believes the methodical and strategic lobbying by the business community, faith groups and activist organizations will **help** motivate the House. He said he is OK with House Republicans taking a step-by-step strategy rather than passing a comprehensive bill like the one he helped craft in the Senate. “My position is, if you can move it piecemeal or sequentially, that’s fine,” Flake said. “If you have to go comprehensive, that’s fine. Let’s get something to the president’s desk.” Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-reform organization America’s Voice, said the two House Republicans who signed on to the alternative Democratic bill also are examples of **momentum**. “When that bill was first introduced, it was widely panned as a Democratic ‘message bill’ that was going nowhere and was setting up the blame game in a run toward 2014,” Sharry said. “But because Democrats made the smart move of making sure every policy in the bill was passed with bipartisan support either in the Senate or the House, it has become a serious offering and a **place where Republicans can go.** I think you will see more Republicans getting on board.” Because of Boehner’s leadership style and uneasy relationship with many of his rank-and-file members, Sharry said, it may take “a convergence and emergence of a critical mass of Republicans to convince leadership to go forward.” Hamer said he believes there is still a possibility for compromise between the House and Senate. “I don’t want to be too Pollyannaish,” he said. “Passing immigration reform is not like renaming a post office. It’s going to be tough.”

#### Obama’s PC is key- but he’s using restraint

Nowicki, 10-25 -- Arizona Republic's national political reporter

[Dan, "Pleas from Obama may hinder immigration bill push," USA Today, 10-25-13, www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/25/obama-immigration-bill-partisanship/3188629/, accessed 10-31-13, mss]

One leading national champion of immigration change dismissed the idea that Obama should defer to House Republicans who dislike him. Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-reform organization America's Voice and an expert in immigration politics, said **the restraint** that **Obama has shown** thus far is testament to how badly the president wants a bill passed. For example, Obama has refrained from trying to punish Republicans politically for holding it up, he said. "Come on, he's the president. He gets to use the bully pulpit to try to set the agenda," Sharry said. "Obviously, it's only going to happen if the House Republicans decide to do it. Everybody in the world knows that everybody wants to get it done except for the divided House GOP." Another immigrant advocate called on Obama to show more leadership by curtailing his administration's "outrageous number of deportations" although such a step also could rile House Republicans. Some GOP lawmakers already have suggested they don't trust the Obama administration to properly enforce any new immigration or border-security laws that might be passed. "From our perspective, the president is definitely a big stakeholder and player in getting immigration reform done," said Cristina Jimenez, managing director of the immigrant-youth network United We Dream. "We don't believe that for the president to step up and push Congress to get this done undermines the efforts," she said. "But we also believe that the president himself could do more."

#### Any Cuba engagement is unpop

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Visas are key to cybersecurity preparedness

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### Cyber-vulnerability causes great power nuclear war

Fritz 9 Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament [Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, <http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf>]

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

### 2

**A. Discourses of danger reproduces an American identity – that posits the US as a the defender of global freedom and liberty**

**Campbell, 98**- Professor of International Politics University of Newcastle (David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity)

The crisis of representation the United States faces is unique only in the particularities of its content. The form of the dilemma is something common to all states. The state has never been a stable ground on which a fixed identity has been secured against danger: the variety of state forms throughout modernity have always been a historically contingent panoply of practices that have served to constitute identity through the negation of difference and the temptation of otherness. With the intensification of state power in the late nineteenth century, Foreign Policy helped contain and discipline the identities to which foreign policy had given rise. In our late modern era, where we find proliferating challenges that cannot be readily contained within the state, the discourse of danger associated with the discursive economy of foreign policy/Foreign Policy will have to work overtime to overcome the ever present threats to the once stable representation of an always unstable sovereign domain. The discursive economy of foreign policy will thus be taxed in its efforts to reproduce and contain challenges to the political identity of nations such as the United States. However, for (the United States of) America— which I have argued is the imagined community par excellence, the state that requires a discourse of danger probably more than any other— the crisis of representation is particularly acute. The operation of anticommunism as a prominent discourse of danger in the United States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— with its ability to encompass the entire population, intensively structure the practices of everyday life, and offer a link between internal and external threats in ways that circumscribe the boundaries of legitimacy— is probably the best example of an effective discourse of danger. But with (as discussed in the Introduction) the globalization of contingency, the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse, reproducing the identity of "the United States" and containing challenges to it are likely to require new discourses of danger. Of course, talk of a shift from old to new discourses of danger drastically oversimplifies the complexity of this cultural terrain. Transformations of this kind do not occur in discrete or sequential stages, for there has always been more than one referent around which danger has crystallized. What appears as new is often the emergence of something previously obscured by that which has faded away or become less salient. In this context, there is no shortage on the horizons of world politics of potential candidates for new discourses of danger (such as AIDS, "terrorism," and the general sign of anarchy and uncertainty). Consider just one example. The environment has occasionally emerged as an international discourse of danger. For example, a focus on the environmental catastrophes of Eastern Europe has been prominent. 2 One of the effects of this interpretation has been to reinscribe East-West understandings of global politics in a period of international transformation by suggesting that "they" in the East are technologically less sophisticated and ecologically more dangerous than "we" in the West. This produces a new boundary that demarcates the "East" from the "West" in a period when the old frontiers of identity are no longer sustainable. But environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges traditional forms of identity inscribed in the capitalist economy of the "West." As a discourse of danger that results in disciplinary strategies that are de-territorialized, involve communal cooperation, and refigure economic relationships, the environment can serve to enframe a different rendering of "reasoning man" than that associated with the subjectivities of liberal capitalism, thereby making it more unstable and undecidable than anticommunism. 3 The major issues regarding the possible emergence of a new discourse of danger(s) in this period can be indicated by some questions. In terms of the reproduction of American identity along the lines established in the cold war, will any of the likely candidates be as extensive or intensive as that which they are needed to replace? In other words, are we going to witness the persistence of cold war practices even after their most recent objects of contention have passed on? Will these practices be represented in the mode of the society of security? Or, alternatively, do any of the new dangers being focused on in this juncture contain the possibility for a different figuration of American identity that would diverge from the enmity of the cold war? These questions, dealing with the rewriting of security, inform the argument in the remaining chapters. To make the analysis more specific, the first task is to consider an issue that has been officially identified a danger or threat necessitating vigilance and defense in the (so-called) post-cold war world: the incidence of drug consumption in America. Before proceeding, an observation about the strategy of argumentation employed in this chapter is in order. It begins with a consideration of the claims of "fact" made by the policy discourses to support their articulation of danger. In discussing counterevidence, my intent is not to juxtapose one realm of fact with another. To the contrary, my desire is to demonstrate that within each realm of policy discourse it is possible to construct, in its own terms, a competing narrative that denaturalizes and unsettles the dominant way of constructing the world, thus prying open the space for an alternative interpretation concerned with the entailments of identity. Indeed, although I begin this chapter by operating largely within the terms of these policy discourses, I have attempted to politicize the terms of the debate. For example, instead of "the drug problem" or "drug abuse" I speak of "drug consumption"; instead of "drug users" or "addicts" I speak of "drug consumers" or "people addicted"; and instead of "drug traffickers" and "cartels" I speak of the "drug industry." Of course, no representation is neutral, and the terms of my discourse are certainly contestable, but their estranging quality is designed to help make obvious the way in which formulations of identity are sequestered within even the technical arguments of public policy with which we are most familiar. 4 As such, this consideration of contemporary discourses illustrates the relevance to the current period of the idea that foreign policy/Foreign Policy is constitutive of political identity.

**B. That makes extinction inevitable**

**Willson, 02**- Ph.D New College San Fransisco, Humanities, JD, American University (Brian, “Armageddon or Quantum Leap? U.S. Imperialism and Human Consciousness from an Evolutionary Perspective”, [**http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html**](http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html))

Awaiting the impending U.S. government's concocted "preventive" war against Iraq (indeed, against the world), this is perhaps one of the most frightening moments in human history. In a surreal scenario, the U.S. government is renewing active threats of using nuclear weapons and reviving use of anti-personnel land mines, and is introducing new technological weapons of death we can only imagine, and some we cannot. As grim as this scene is, I believe it must be the inevitable and logical extension of the continued growth ad nauseum of the American Way Of Life (AWOL) in particular, and the Western Way Of Life in general. Premeditated murder of thousands--perhaps millions--of innocents is the price for AWOL's insatiable consumption and its bloodthirsty vengeance, totally abdicating responsibility for lethal consequences to the planet and its species, including, ironically, our own. Perhaps Gaia is presenting the current transparent dangers to us as like a cosmic gift so that we might actually be able to *see* the extraordinary folly of our ways in time to creatively "storm the Bastille."U.S. Terrorist Roots U.S. civilization was founded on and has been sustained by terrorism, facilitated by Eurocentric racism, classism, and arrogant ethnocentrism. The grossest irony of all, of course, is that the "War on Terror," to be successful, must focus on our own civilization, the most egregious proponent of terror the world has even known. Terror was systematically utilized since our country's beginnings in the 1600s. The following instructions, facilitated by a cruel racism, are part of the historic record: "burning and spoiling the [Indian] country," (Captain John Underhill, Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1636); "put to death the [Pequot Indian] men of Block Island" (Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop's order to Captain John Endecott, 1637); "laying waste," and instilling "terror...by any means" among the Indians (General George Washington, 1779); "[with] malice enough in our hearts to destroy everything that contributes to their support" (General John Sullivan, 1779).

In a prominent history book published in 1906 (*The History of the United States,* James Wilford Garner, Ph.D. and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ph.D, L.L.D), the "destruction" of the American Indian is explained as follows: "History teaches that inferior people must yield to a superior civilization....They must take on civilization or pass out. The Negro was able to endure slavery while learning the rudiments of civilization; the Indian could not endure slavery, and...refused to be taught." Attitudes uttered by white, Puritan, Christian men, civilian and military, thus set the tone for our civilization, sentiments that to this day have not been seriously renounced. We remain primarily a white male supremacy society with overtly expressed as well as suppressed sentiments of racism and classism dominating much of our political life and foreign policy. How can someone drop a bomb knowing that thousands of innocents will be murdered if the bomber is not possessed by cruel racism and/or ugly ethnocentrism? Conveniently left out of the historical record is the fact that our civilization has been founded on three holocausts, the first being theft of virtually all our land base at gunpoint while murdering millions of the original inhabitants. The second brought us "free" labor from Africa, but resulted in two-thirds of all those originally targeted for apprehension being murdered in the process of trying to escape or from being stowed as human cargo in slave ships known as floating coffins. The third holocaust took place during what the founder and publisher of *Time* and *Life* magazines, Thomas Luce, called "The American Century." This century witnessed more than 300 military and perhaps 10,000 covert interventions by the U.S. into more than 100 countries, stealing resources at gunpoint while murdering millions of the increasing numbers of impoverished people struggling for independence. "American exceptionalism" must succeed at *any* cost. In the process, the three Buddhist "poisons" are employed: greed -- for profit at any cost of human suffering; hatred -- of any obstacles to profit; ignorance -- of the intimate link between Western corporations/governments and "Third World" repressive regimes.  U.S. Oligarchy It does not matter which of the two parties, the republocrats or demoblicans, is in power. They both easily consented to the selection of their chief executive officer in violation of the rights of thousands of illegally disenfranchised Black voters, and of their Constitutional system itself that makes no provision for the Supreme Court to make such selection. Both believe in preserving the "national security" of AWOL, which means continued, unabated acceleration of extraction, consumption and pollution patterns, and obscene profits for the plutocrats and their bribed oligarchs in Washington. For all this to happen, Mr. Bush, indeed, has laid out the necessary plans for a world imperium to assure, in his and his cohorts' minds, continuation of our Western way of life, business- and profits-as-usual.  These oligarchs are not able to perceive the fact that further continuation of AWOL guarantees our destruction. They are not able to even consider the need for radical contraction and creative alternatives. They act as if blind drunk with their personal and political values of money and power, under the cloak of their disfigured version of Jesus. Unfortunately, the inevitable consequences of their business-as-usual forces are systematic destruction of virtually all sustainable ecosystems and human-created institutions.   Origins of "Civilization" Some history. As the revolution of urban civilization took root some 5,000 years ago the basic ingredients of "Western civilization" were introduced into our human evolutionary journey. The basic model of "civilization," for all but the most isolated and exceptional Indigenous groups, has seen the advent of powerful male oligarchs surrounded by elite bureaucracies of scribes and priests, overseeing hierarchies that involuntarily enforced large numbers of laborers, often violently captured during wars, to construct large projects for the pleasure of the king. Wars, systematic violence, and harsh class division originated with "civilizations." Secrecy of priestly knowledge about cosmic regularities and calendar-making assured that knowledge was monopolized by the small elite surrounding the oligarch. And the maxim, "the best defense is attack," was often used in early warfare, roots of our preventive strikes of today. According to Asian and Scandinavian scholars there have been nearly 15,000 wars during the last 5,000 years.   Extraordinarily Dangerous Trends The U.S. economy reveals increasing vulnerabilities to the fiction and hot air behind Wall Street and the continued exploitation and creation of misery upon which it is based. The U.S. regime has chosen to protect its illusion of omnipotence under the veil of fighting "terrorism" and its curtailing of civil liberties is similar to a police state. Increasingly desperate means used by people in power to maintain that power is a historically typical, predictable phenomenon. Never before, however, have oligarchs commanded so much power and possessed so many weapons of mass destruction, with explicit intentions to use such weapons preventively rather than defensively. I believe that we are at a pivotal point in history. We sit precariously perched on a ledge overlooking imminent extinction as a very real possibility at this juncture in our long, 7- to 8-million-year human evolutionary journey. Academics often talk about how history is cyclical, but two demonstrable trends, clearly not cyclical, indicate that we are dangerously near the end of our evolutionary branch

**C. Alternative text – reject the affirmative to desecuritize the Political. Vote negative to challenge securitization itself in favor of a political ethic that approaches problems in non-security terms and exposes the limits of their methodology.**

**D. Framework – security is a communicative action that requires discursive justification – there is an ethical responsibility to justify securitization in political discussion. The role of the ballot is to interrogate methodologies – to weigh their case the Aff has to legitimize securitization first**

**Williams, 03** [Michael – IR Prof @ University of Ottawa, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 511-53, Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association, JSTOR] <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693634>

A second major criticism of the Copenhagen School concerns the ethics of securitization. Simply put, if security is nothing more than a specific form of social practice-a speech-act tied to existential threat and a politics of emergency-then does this mean that anything can be treated as a "security" issue and that, as a consequence, any form of violent, exclusionary, or irrationalist politics must be viewed simply as another form of "speech-act" and treated "objectively"? Questions such as these have led many to ask whether despite its avowedly "constructivist" view of security practices, securitization theory is implicitly committed to a methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity, and emergency.29 A first response to this issue is to note that the Copenhagen School has not shied away from confronting it. In numerous places the question of the ethics of securitization are discussed as raising difficult issues. As Wever has argued in relation to theorizing the highly sensitive issue of identity, for example, Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity, but have also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as security issues. We have also to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in nonsecurity terms, that is to take on the problems but leave them unsecuritized. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize themselves as security agents that are under threat. This process of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, without thereby actually legitimizing it. (1995: 66; see also Waever, 1999). As sustained as these considerations have been, it must be admitted that the answers are somewhat less searching than the questioning, and that this remains one of the most underarticulated aspects of securitization theory (Wyn Jones, 1999: 111-12). I would like to suggest, however, that there are two important issues at stake in these questions, each of which can be clarified through a greater recognition of the Schmittian elements of securitization theory. The first, and simplest point is that in some ways the Copenhagen School treats securitization not as a normative question, 27 I owe this insight especially to Didier Bigo. 28 Again, there are clear links here between securitization theory and classical Realism's stress on the "ethic of responsibility." 29 Voiced, for example, in Erickson (1999). These issues are, of course, also central to debates concerning social constructivismm ore generally.S ee in particulart he exchange between John Mearsheimer( 1994/95, 1995) and Alexander Wendt (1995). A broad overview can be found in Price and Reus-Smit (1998). 521 Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics but as an objective process and possibility. Very much like Schmitt, they view securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life. In regard to his concept of the political, for example, Schmitt once argued, It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend-enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equally clearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization, even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes. I would like to suggest that it is in response to these issues, and in regard to the realm of ethical practice, that the idea of security as a speech-actta kes on an importance well beyond its role as a tool of social explanation. Casting securitization as a speechact places that act within a framework of communicative action and legitimation that links it to a discursive ethics that seeks to avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization. While the Copenhagen School has been insufficiently clear in developing these aspects of securitization theory, they link clearly to some of the most interesting current analyses of the practical ethics of social-constructivism. As Thomas Risse (2000) has recently argued, communicative action is not simply a realm of instrumental rationality and rhetorical manipulation. Communicative action involves a process of argument, the provision of reasons, presentation of evidence, and commitment to convincing others of the validity of one's position. Communicative action (speech-acts) are thus not just given social practices, they are implicated in a process of justification. Moreover, as processes of dialogue, communicative action has a potentially transformative capacity. As Risse puts it: Argumentative rationality appears to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities. When actors engage in a truth-seeking discourse, they must be prepared to change their own views of the world, their interests, and sometimes even their identities. (2000: 2)31 30 More broadly,i t can be argued that for Schmitti t was not only a possibilityb, ut a choice, a decision, that he paradoxically saw as necessary if a vital human life was to be lived. For an analysis of Schmitt in relation to a vitalistic romanticisma nd a virulenth ostilityt o liberalisms ee againW olin( 1992). Schmitt'sv italismm arkso ne of the clearest differences with the Copenhagen School, as discussed below. 31 Risse's analysis here draws greatly on that of Habermas. For Habermas's own treatment of speech-act theory see Habermas (1984). For Habermas's own views on Schmitt see Habermas (1990); a recent brief survey of the relationship between Habermas and Schmitt in the context of International Relations is Wheeler (2000), and a more extended and varied collection is Wyn Jones (2001). As speech-acts, securitizations are in principle forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Speech-act theory entails the possibility of argument, of dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security perceptions both within and between states. The securitizing speech-act must be accepted by the audience, and while the Copenhagen School is careful to note that "[a]ccept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent," it is nonetheless the case that "[s]ince securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one's case"(Buzan et al., 1998: 23), and that "[s]uccessful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects"( 1998:31). It is via this commitment to communicative action and discursive ethics, I would like to suggest, that the Copenhagen School seeks to avoid the radical realpolitik that might otherwise seem necessarily to follow from the Schmittian elements of the theory of securitization. Schmitt appeals to the necessity and inescapability of decision, enmity, and "the political." He appeals to the mobilizing power of myth in the production of friends and enemies, and asserts the need for a single point of decision to the point of justifying dictatorship. He mythologizes war and enmity as the paramount moments of political life.32 By contrast, the Copenhagen School treats securitization as a social process, and casts it as a phenomenon largely to be avoided. Securitization is the Schmittian realm of the political, and for precisely this reason it is dangerous and-by and large-to be avoided.33 This element of the Copenhagen School is clearly illustrated in the concepts of "desecuritization" and "asecurity" which form integral aspects of securitization theory. As a consequence of their Schmittian understanding of security-and in contrast to many (indeed most) other forms of security studies-the Copenhagen School does not regard security as an unambiguously positive value. In most cases, securitization is something to be avoided. While casting an issue as one of "security" may help elevate its position on the political agenda, it also risks placing that issue within the logic of threat and decision, and potentially within the contrast of friend and enemy.34 "Security,"accordingly, is something to be invoked with great care and, in general, minimized rather than expanded-a movement that should be sought in the name of stability, tolerance, and political negotiation, not in opposition to it. "Desecuritization" involves precisely this process; a moving of issues off the "security" agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and "normal" political dispute and accommodation. The transformation of many elements of European security as part of the end of the Cold War stands as a key example (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup, and Lemaitre, 1993). Similarly, the concept of "asecurity" designates a (probably optimal) situation in which relations are so firmly "politicized" that there is little chance of them becoming re-securitized, a case that Waever argues is illustrated by the Nordic countries whose relations with each other constitute an "asecurity community" rather than a "security community" in the more conventional sense (Waver, 1998b). 32 See, for example, the direct discussion of-and partial contrast to-Schmitt's use of enmity in the construction of sovereignty in Waver (1995: fn. 63); Schmitt also figures in the analysis of religion as a "referent object" pursued in Bagge Lausten and Waver (2000:726, 733). 33 Here, too, the links to classical Realism are strong, for as William Scheuerman (1999) has brilliantly illustrated, this was precisely the tack adopted by Hans Morgenthau in his extended critical engagement with Schmitt. 34 Recognizing this particular Schmittian legacy hopefully also helps clarify the dispute between the Copenhagen School and those who think its scepticism toward the word and concept of "security" is politically debilitating. 523 Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics As a contribution to political practice, the sociological analysis of the Copenhagen School attempts to provide tools whereby these transformative processes can be fostered. By exposing the limits imposed by the securitization of specific issues, it provides resources for challenging these limitations. In presenting security as a speech-act, the Copenhagen School is doing more than developing a sociological thesis: it is presenting a political ethic. This does not mean that securitizations will always be forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Indeed, part of the power of securitization theory lies in its stress on how "security" issues are often or usually insulated from this process of public debate: they operate in the realm of secrecy, of "national security," of decision. Equally, relations may be "sedimented" to such a degree that discursive ethics and tactics of social negotiation are unlikely to succeed and need to be subordinated (at least in the short term) to more traditional mechanisms of (relatively fixed) interest manipulation and material power balancing.35 These are key elements of any analysis of security policy. But the limitations should also not be overstated. As resistant as they may be, these security policies and relationships are susceptible to being pulled back into the public realm and capable of transformation, particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat, or both.36

### 3

The Supreme Court of the United States should grant a writ of certiorari for the PERNOD RICARD USA LLC v. BACARDI INC case and rule in favor of Pernod Ricard USA LLC.

#### CP solves the case – the plan solves Pernod’s appeal. From the 1ac solvency author.

Reinsch 10 (Bill Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council, representing some 400 companies on focuses—and focuses on trade policy issues, a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK IMPLICATIONS OF HAVANA CLUB AND SECTION 211 OF THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1999." HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION. MARCH 3, 2010.<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg55221/html/CHRG-111hhrg55221.htm)>

And by the way--for all this talk of litigation there has ¶ been one infringement lawsuit brought and one decision that has ¶ been made, that was appealed to the second circuit, cert denied ¶ at the Supreme Court, and that was the lawsuit that Mr. Orr's ¶ company brought against Bacardi for their use of Havana Club. ¶ And they lost.

### 4

#### Substantial is that which grounds and shapes – not numerical minutiae. The primary substance that is the foundation for economic engagement toward Cuba is the embargo. The plan only changes an instance of the embargo – this is ACCIDENTAL NOT SUBSTANTIAL

Malaguti, 11 (Michael J., practices with the Concord firm of Ransmeier & Spellman, “Substantial Confusion: The Use and Misuse of the Word ‘Substantial’ in the Legal Profession,” August, 52 N.H.B.J. 6, p. l/n)

Aristotle's definies substance as "that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject." n25 By this, Aristotle is referring to what he calls "primary substance" - "the truest and most definite sense of the word." n26 Aristotle tells us that the individual man and the individual horse are both primary substances. n27 Individual instances of things are not predicable of a subject because an individual instance cannot be said of a subject. Put another way, it would be impossible for me to assert "Eric" of "John." n28 This follows from the proposition that "John" and "Eric" are individual instances. Additionally, "Eric" is not present in "John." That is, "John" is not characterized by "Eric-ness" but rather "John-ness." But primary substances are not the only substances. "Eric" and "John" themselves fall into broader categories of things. "Eric" and "John" are both "humans." n29 Pause for a moment to note why "human" is not a primary substance by applying Aristotle's definition. First, "human" is predicable of a subject. n30 It is possible to say that "Eric" or "John" is characterized by "human-ness." n31 It is also true that "humanness" is present in "Eric" or "John." Secondary substances, then, are "the species and genera of the primary substances - the kinds into which the primary substances fall." n32 One author's explanation helps concretize these concepts: Each individual entity has a primary "substance" (Greek: ousia). One sense of this term is that" [o]usia is what something is; the answer to the question 'What is F' tells us the ousia of F. In these cases it is rendered by 'essence' . . . . " This primary and individual substance (the particular individual, "Eric") underlies everything else, including and especially the "secondary" substances to which the individual belongs, in this case "man" and "animal." We see then that the particular entity "Eric" consists of an essential substance that makes him what he is. n33 It is from Aristotle's definition that we have received the word "substance" into the English language: "A [secondary] substance . . . is the essence (the 'what it is to be'), the form (morphe or eidos), of a [primary substance]. . . ." n34 Thus, the word substance "corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means 'being,' transmitted via the Latin substantia, which means 'something that stands under or grounds things.'" n35 Lastly, and most significant, is Aristotle's distinction between "substance" and "accident:" With respect to any substance, we can typically distinguish between properties that are essential for the thing to be the kind of thing it is and properties that are inessential (the accidents) . . . . An individual [\*8] diamond must consist of carbon in appropriate crystalline structure, and must have a scratch hardness of 10 on the Mohs scale - these are essential properties. But it may be large or small; white, blue, red, green or black; be set in a crown or other setting - these are accidental properties. n36 This illustrates what is meant when it is said that substance is "that which lies beneath." The accidental properties may come and go, but the substance, standing as it does beneath the accidental properties, remains. It is clear then that substance, as it was originally used, had nothing to do with size - a descriptive category that is embodied today in the most prevalent use of "substance." n37 The substance-accident dichotomy illustrates this perfectly. Something is "substantial" if it lies beneath - that is, if it is essential to making something what it is. Significantly, size was, to Aristotle, an accidental property. As Aristotle observed in Categories: Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, po-sition, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are "man" or "the horse", of quantity, such terms as "two cubits long" or "three cubits long", of quality, such attributes as "white", "grammatical". "Double", "half", "greater", fall under the category of relation; "in the market place", "in the Lyceum", under that of place; "yesterday", "last year", under that of time. "Lying", "sitting", are terms indicating position.; "shod", "armed", state; "to lance", "to cauterize", action; "to be lanced", "to be cauterized", affection. n38 It therefore would not have made sense to Aristotle to say, for instance, a "substantial amount," or a "substantial number," because such a statement rests on a conflation of substance and accident. To use the diamond example, the size of the diamond may change without affecting its "diamond-ness."

Prefer it

1) Limits – Allowing any other definition is unpredictable. Justifies lifting the embargo for any commodity – infinitely delimits

2) Ground – marginal changes to manifestations of the embargo NOT the embargo policy itself destroys negative link ground for trade DA’s and CP ground which also shifts the uniqueness debate

### WTO

**Protectionism won’t spiral out of control – interdependence**

**Marshall**, **09** (Andrew – asia political risk correspondent, Assault on free trade a key political risk, Reuters, 1/21/2009, p. lexis)

PREVENTING DISASTER Despite the risks, many analysts argue that a wholesale retreat into protectionism can be averted, because globalization has brought benefits governments will not want to reverse. "Fears that the financial crisis is ushering in an era of intensive nationalism and protectionism are overwrought," said Control Risks in its outlook for 2009. "The financial crisis has ... demonstrated that the global economy remains deeply interconnected and dependent on forging compromises between domestic politics and international capital." Cheap imports from emerging markets have brought significant benefits to consumers and companies in the developed world. "This factor, combined with the entrenched nature of global supply chains, is likely to **limit** the political **tolerance for protectionism**, at least in the main developed-country markets and in emerging markets that are highly dependent on exports," the Economist Intelligence Unit said.

#### There isn’t incentive for any country to leave global trade

#### Multilat is inevitable BRIC & NATO are the only militarily tied institutions and won’t trade off with a loss in trade

#### 1. Terrorists won’t pursue or use nuclear weapons

Waltz, 03 (Kenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 130)

For terrorists who abandon tactics of disruption and harassment in favor of dealing in wholesale death and destruction, instruments other than nuclear weapons are more readily available. Poisons and germs are easier to get than nuclear weapons, and poisoning a city’s water supply, though rather complicated, is more easily done than blowing a city up. Nevertheless, terrorists may seek to gain control of nuclear materials and use them to threaten or destroy. Yet, with shaky control of nuclear weapons materials in Russia and perhaps in Pakistan, and with the revelation in 1994 that the United States had lost track of some of its nuclear materials, one can hardly believe that nuclear weapons spreading to another country or two every now and then adds much to the chances that terrorists will be able to buy or steal nuclear materials. Plentiful sources are already available. Nuclear terror is a problem distinct from the spread of nuclear weapons to a few more countries. Terrorists have done a fair bit of damage by using conventional weapons and have sometimes got their way by threatening to use them. Might terrorists not figure they can achieve more still by threatening to explode nuclear weapons on cities of countries they may wish to bend to their bidding? Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists *can* get nuclear weapons they *will* get them, and then all hell will break loose. This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, they will use them for aggression. Both assumptions are false. Would the courses of action we fear, if followed, promise more gains than losses or more pains than profits? The answers are obvious. Terrorists have some hope of reaching their long-term goals through patient pressure and constant harassment. They cannot hope to do so by issuing unsustainable threats to wreak great destruction, threats they would not want to execute anyway.

#### 2. No risk of nuclear terrorism—can’t get material, can’t make the bomb, and can’t bring it into the US

Chapman, 08(Steve, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism”, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the\_implausibility\_of\_nuclear.html)

But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother.

#### 3. No way for terrorists to produce a nuke on their own – Iraq proves

Kamp, 96 (Karl-Heinz, heads the foreign and security policy section of the Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Agustin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July)

Reports of nuclear smuggling appear to lend added weight to the idea that terrorists can build their own bombs, because they suggest that fissile material may now be obtained on a nuclear black market. After all, if gram quantities of uranium 235 and plutonium 239 have appeared on the market, it seems likely that larger quantities are also available. And in view of remarks made by readily quoted "experts"--that one kilogram of plutonium is enough to piece together a nuclear weapon--it would seem virtually inevitable that some terrorist group will build a bomb. But the idea that terrorists can readily build a bomb is naive. After all, a number of countries with vast resources and a wide range of scientific and technical personnel have struggled unsuccessfully to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's nuclear program, which was exposed after the Persian Gulf War, is an example of a costly, time-consuming, and ultimately unsuccessful quest for a nuclear device. Iraq began recruiting nuclear experts in the early 1970s, and used its worldwide trade links and an elaborate secret procurement network in an effort to obtain the necessary technology. Failing at more advanced methods, Iraq eventually turned to an extremely energy-intensive technology--"calutrons"--that the United States had used to produce uranium in the 1940s. Still, after spending 20 years and more than a billion dollars, Iraq had yet to produce a functioning weapon by the time it was defeated in 1991. It is difficult to imagine that a small terrorist group or an individual--who would certainly have far fewer resources--would find bomb building easier.

# IPR

#### 1. Empirically denied – diseases have been around forever and haven’t caused extinction. Plus, genetic diversity ensures that some humans will always survive.

#### 2. No disease can kill us all – it would have to be everything at once

Gladwell, 95 (Malcolm, The New Republic, 7/17/95 and 7/24/95, “The Plague Year”, Lexis)

What would a real Andromeda Strain look like? It would be highly infectious like the flu, spread through casual contact. But it would also have to be structured in such a way as to avoid the kind of selection bias that usually exists against virulent strains. For that reason, it would need to move stealthily through its host, infecting so silently that the victim would not know to take precautions, and so slowly that the victim would have years in which pass on the infection to someone else. The Andromeda Strain, in short, the virus that really could kill 80 or 90 percent of humanity, would be an airborne version of HIV. In fact, doomsday types have for years been conjuring up this possibility for the end of mankind. The problem, however, **is that it is very difficult to imagine how such a super-virus could ever come about**. For a start, it is not clear how HIV could become airborne and still be lethal. (This was the argument of Howard Temin, the late Nobel Prize-winning virologist.) What makes HIV so dangerous is that it seeks out and selectively kills the key blood cells of the human immune system. To be airborne, it would have to shift its preference to the cells of the respiratory system. (Ebola, which is not nearly so selective, probably doesn't need to change personality to become airborne.) How, then, could it still cause aids? Why wouldn't it be just another cold virus? Then there is the problem of mutation. To become airborne, HIV would have to evolve in such a way as to become more durable. Right now the virus is highly sensitive to changes in temperature and light. But it is hardly going to do any damage if it dies the moment it is coughed into the air and exposed to ultraviolet rays. HIV would have to get as tough as a cold virus, which can live for days on a countertop or a doorknob. At the same time HIV would have to get more flexible. Right now HIV mutates in only a limited manner. The virus essentially keeps changing its clothes, but its inner workings stay the same. It kills everyone by infecting the same key blood cells. To become airborne, it would have to undergo a truly fundamental transformation, switching to an entirely different class of cells. How can HIV make two contradictory changes at the same time, becoming both less and more flexible? **This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument**. Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: **as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation** that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the **limitations** of microscopic life forms.

#### 3. Multiple alternate causalities to disease

Brower, 03 (Jennifer, science/technology policy analyst, and Peter Chalk, political scientist, Summer 2003, Rand Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, “Vectors Without Borders,” <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/vectors.html>)

This year's outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Beijing, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Toronto is only one of the more recent examples of the challenge posed by infectious diseases. Highly resilient varieties of age-old ailments— as well as virulent emerging pathogens—are now prevalent throughout the world. These illnesses include cholera, pneumonia, malaria, and dysentery in the former case and Legionnaires' disease, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), Ebola, and SARS in the latter. In the United States, West Nile virus entered New York in 2000 and then spread to 44 states by 2002, and monkey pox struck the Midwest this June. **In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of antibiotic and drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and acts of bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with potentially fatal diseases**.

#### 4. Intervention checks – if 50% of the population started dying, people would take precautions to prevent future outbreaks.

#### 5. Medicine solves -- old diseases would never rise again to kill us all -- penicillin is awesome -- it solves the botanic plague, hydration solves Ebola, and small pox has pretty much been eradicated.

#### 6. Most diseases are dumb -- they can't kill us all the only disease close to this is HIV but if people started releasing this or it actually became a pandemic people would probably start figuring out how to treat it.

#### 7. Natural immunities check -- portions of populations are immune to HIV

**Henahan, NO DATE** -- correspondent for various medical trade publications including the Medical Tribune, Modern Medicine, Diagnostic Imaging, Physician's Radio Network, Drug Topics and the Newspaper of Cardiology, contributing editor for Ophthalmology Times and Primary Psychiatry (Sean, "WEAK FORM OF HIV MAY PROVIDE IMMUNITY", Access Excellence, No Date, July 30th 2010, http://www.accessexcellence.org/WN/SUA05/hiv2.php, KONTOPOULOS)

A less virulent strain of HIV (HIV-2) appears to offer natural protection from the virus that causes AIDS, report researchers from Harvard University. The finding offers encouragement to scientists attempting to develop AIDS vaccines. Researchers from Harvard and Senegal's Cheikh Anta Diop University have been monitoring HIV infection and disease over the past nine years in a group Senegalese sex workers. They found that women with HIV-2 failed to develop AIDS symptoms for prolonged periods of time and that the women were significantly less likely to subsequently become infected with HIV-1. The 756 participants in the study underwent regular testing for HIV-1, HIV-2 and various sexually transmitted diseases. Serum samples were evaluated using immunoblotting for antibody reactivity to the viral antigens of both forms of HIV. Serum samples showing dual reactivity were tested again using recombinant peptides from the envelope protein regions HIV-1 and HIV-2. Dual infection was confirmed using PCR. The protective effect of HIV-2 was consistent throughout the study. The HIV-2 infected women were far less likely to become infected with HIV-1 than women who were not infected with HIV-2. The researchers were uncertain whether initial infection with HIV-1 would block infection with HIV-2. While the cross-protective mechanisms aren't known, the results may point to new avenues for HIV-1 vaccine development. The protection provided by HIV-2 may be a result of cross-reactive immunity to epitopes found in both forms of the virus. Receptor blockage, HIV-1 replication suppression, and inhibition of HIV-1 gene expression are all being evaluated as potential explanations for the cross-protection observed in this study. HIV-2, found almost exclusively in West Africa, was discovered shortly after HIV-1. HIV-2 shares substantial genetic features with HIV-1, demonstrated by common cellular receptors and partial antigenic cross-reactivity. However, patients infected with HIV-2 can remain symptom-free for decades without getting sick. Even after HIV-2 disease manifests, it is not as severe as the sudden immune collapse seen in AIDS. "Our data suggest that HIV-2 infection provides approximately 70% protection from subsequent HIV-1 protection. Despite the demonstrated protection potential and the lower virulence of HIV-2, the risks involved in any live attenuated vaccine may far outweigh the potential benefits. There fore we would rather suggest that the immune effector mechanisms identified in HIV-2 seropositive individuals may be targeted to cross-reactive epitopes that could be useful in HIV-1 vaccine development," said Dr. Phyllis Kanki, Harvard AIDS Institute.

### IPR

**1. Empirically denied – diseases have been around forever and haven’t caused extinction. Plus, genetic diversity ensures that some humans will always survive.**

**2. No disease can kill us all – it would have to be everything at once**

Gladwell, 95 (Malcolm, The New Republic, 7/17/95 and 7/24/95, “The Plague Year”, Lexis)

What would a real Andromeda Strain look like? It would be highly infectious like the flu, spread through casual contact. But it would also have to be structured in such a way as to avoid the kind of selection bias that usually exists against virulent strains. For that reason, it would need to move stealthily through its host, infecting so silently that the victim would not know to take precautions, and so slowly that the victim would have years in which pass on the infection to someone else. The Andromeda Strain, in short, the virus that really could kill 80 or 90 percent of humanity, would be an airborne version of HIV. In fact, doomsday types have for years been conjuring up this possibility for the end of mankind. The problem, however, **is that it is very difficult to imagine how such a super-virus could ever come about**. For a start, it is not clear how HIV could become airborne and still be lethal. (This was the argument of Howard Temin, the late Nobel Prize-winning virologist.) What makes HIV so dangerous is that it seeks out and selectively kills the key blood cells of the human immune system. To be airborne, it would have to shift its preference to the cells of the respiratory system. (Ebola, which is not nearly so selective, probably doesn't need to change personality to become airborne.) How, then, could it still cause aids? Why wouldn't it be just another cold virus? Then there is the problem of mutation. To become airborne, HIV would have to evolve in such a way as to become more durable. Right now the virus is highly sensitive to changes in temperature and light. But it is hardly going to do any damage if it dies the moment it is coughed into the air and exposed to ultraviolet rays. HIV would have to get as tough as a cold virus, which can live for days on a countertop or a doorknob. At the same time HIV would have to get more flexible. Right now HIV mutates in only a limited manner. The virus essentially keeps changing its clothes, but its inner workings stay the same. It kills everyone by infecting the same key blood cells. To become airborne, it would have to undergo a truly fundamental transformation, switching to an entirely different class of cells. How can HIV make two contradictory changes at the same time, becoming both less and more flexible? **This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument**. Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: **as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation** that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the **limitations** of microscopic life forms.

**3. Multiple alternate causalities to disease**

Brower, 03 (Jennifer, science/technology policy analyst, and Peter Chalk, political scientist, Summer 2003, Rand Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, “Vectors Without Borders,” <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/vectors.html>)

This year's outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Beijing, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Toronto is only one of the more recent examples of the challenge posed by infectious diseases. Highly resilient varieties of age-old ailments— as well as virulent emerging pathogens—are now prevalent throughout the world. These illnesses include cholera, pneumonia, malaria, and dysentery in the former case and Legionnaires' disease, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), Ebola, and SARS in the latter. In the United States, West Nile virus entered New York in 2000 and then spread to 44 states by 2002, and monkey pox struck the Midwest this June. In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of antibiotic and drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and acts of bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with potentially fatal diseases.

**4. Intervention checks – if 50% of the population started dying, people would take precautions to prevent future outbreaks.**

**5. Medicine solves -- old diseases would never rise again to kill us all -- penicillin is awesome -- it solves the botanic plague, hydration solves Ebola, and small pox has pretty much been eradicated.**

**6. Most diseases are dumb -- they can't kill us all the only disease close to this is HIV but if people started releasing this or it actually became a pandemic people would probably start figuring out how to treat it.**

**7. Natural immunities check -- portions of populations are immune to HIV**

**Henahan, NO DATE** -- correspondent for various medical trade publications including the Medical Tribune, Modern Medicine, Diagnostic Imaging, Physician's Radio Network, Drug Topics and the Newspaper of Cardiology, contributing editor for Ophthalmology Times and Primary Psychiatry (Sean, "WEAK FORM OF HIV MAY PROVIDE IMMUNITY", Access Excellence, No Date, July 30th 2010, http://www.accessexcellence.org/WN/SUA05/hiv2.php, KONTOPOULOS)

A less virulent strain of HIV (HIV-2) appears to offer natural protection from the virus that causes AIDS, report researchers from Harvard University. The finding offers encouragement to scientists attempting to develop AIDS vaccines. Researchers from Harvard and Senegal's Cheikh Anta Diop University have been monitoring HIV infection and disease over the past nine years in a group Senegalese sex workers. They found that women with HIV-2 failed to develop AIDS symptoms for prolonged periods of time and that the women were significantly less likely to subsequently become infected with HIV-1. The 756 participants in the study underwent regular testing for HIV-1, HIV-2 and various sexually transmitted diseases. Serum samples were evaluated using immunoblotting for antibody reactivity to the viral antigens of both forms of HIV. Serum samples showing dual reactivity were tested again using recombinant peptides from the envelope protein regions HIV-1 and HIV-2. Dual infection was confirmed using PCR. The protective effect of HIV-2 was consistent throughout the study. The HIV-2 infected women were far less likely to become infected with HIV-1 than women who were not infected with HIV-2. The researchers were uncertain whether initial infection with HIV-1 would block infection with HIV-2. While the cross-protective mechanisms aren't known, the results may point to new avenues for HIV-1 vaccine development. The protection provided by HIV-2 may be a result of cross-reactive immunity to epitopes found in both forms of the virus. Receptor blockage, HIV-1 replication suppression, and inhibition of HIV-1 gene expression are all being evaluated as potential explanations for the cross-protection observed in this study. HIV-2, found almost exclusively in West Africa, was discovered shortly after HIV-1. HIV-2 shares substantial genetic features with HIV-1, demonstrated by common cellular receptors and partial antigenic cross-reactivity. However, patients infected with HIV-2 can remain symptom-free for decades without getting sick. Even after HIV-2 disease manifests, it is not as severe as the sudden immune collapse seen in AIDS. "Our data suggest that HIV-2 infection provides approximately 70% protection from subsequent HIV-1 protection. Despite the demonstrated protection potential and the lower virulence of HIV-2, the risks involved in any live attenuated vaccine may far outweigh the potential benefits. There fore we would rather suggest that the immune effector mechanisms identified in HIV-2 seropositive individuals may be targeted to cross-reactive epitopes that could be useful in HIV-1 vaccine development," said Dr. Phyllis Kanki, Harvard AIDS Institute.